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PAYING FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP UNDER C.E.R.C.L.A.:
A SURVEY OF THE STATE OF THE LAW IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
KERRY ANNE DOYLE*
One of the hottest areas of litigation today concerns responsibility
for environmental cleanup costs. The controversy often involves insurance
policyholders who are seeking indemnification under comprehensive
general liability policies ("CGLs") for costs incurred under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
("CERCLA" or "Superfund").' Superfund has placed on its National
Priorities List, 1236 contaminated sites which the federal government has
deemed so dangerous that they must be cleaned up immediately, or as soon
as allowed by the protracted process of investigation, notification,
litigation, cleanup and reimbursement.2 The Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") chooses the site, names the potentially responsible parties
("PRPs"), performs the necessary containment and cleanup, and bills the
PRPs for all cleanup costs. 3
Cleanup costs are tremendous, with estimates ranging from $500
billion to $750 billion overall 4 and $25 million for each site.5
Unfortunately, the costs of cleaning up even a portion of one site can
bankrupt a small business, and the costs of cleanup plus litigation can ruin
B.A. Smith College, 1989; J.D. Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William
and Mary, expected 1993.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988). Superfund was enacted by Congress in 1980 for
the purpose of establishing a $1.6 billion trust fund to clean up the country's hazardous
waste dump sites over a five year period and to respond to accidents that release
hazardous substances into the environment. Ruth Gastel, Environmental Pollution:
Insurance Issues, April 1992, INs. INFo. INsT. REPORTS. Additionally, Superfund
empowered government agencies to recover trust fund monies spent in the cleanup process
and to order responsible parties, including site owners and operators, waste transporters
and site users, to clean up the sites independently. Id. The act was financed by a tax on
chemical feedsticks, crude oil and imported petroleum products. Id.
2. Gastel, supra note 1.
3. Katherine Taylor Eubank, Paying the Costs of Hazardous Waste Pollution: Why
is the Insurance Industry Raising Such a Stink?, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 173, 182.
4. See Lisa Gibbs, Pollution Liability Spurs Insurer-Insured Disputes; Carriers are
Denying Requests for Coverage from Business Owners, NJ.LJ., Dec. 16, 1991, 4 (costs
to clean up Superfund sites are estimated at $500 billion to $750 billion).
5. Gastel, supra note 1.
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a much larger business.' The PRPs attempt to bill their insurance
companies, who generally refuse to defend or indemnify the responsible
companies.7 The insurance industry has warned Congress that the present
system is unworkable! With total surplus and reserves of the United
States insurance industry estimated at only $130 billion,9 the industry
cannot finance a massive cleanup of the environment.
Precisely because the stakes are so high, litigation is especially
fierce. Disagreements among states and among circuits exist on every
major issue. Regrettably, the United States Supreme Court is unable to
introduce uniform standards and policies because state law governs
insurance contract law.1° Disagreements among courts also have created
the possibility of forum shopping," as Continental Insurance Co. v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical Co.' and Independent Petrochemical Corp.
v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.'3 illustrate. These cases both involve
cleanup of the Times Beach toxic waste site in Missouri. In Continental,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that an
insurer had no obligation to indemnify the insured for cleanup costs which
were not included in the term "damages" as used in the standard general
liability insurance policy. 4
6. See Eubank, supra note 3, at 173 n.4. See also Bamaby J. Feder, Business and the
Law; The Insurer's Role in Waste Cleanup, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1991, at D2.
7. See Gibbs, supra note 4.
8. Gastel, supra note 1.
9. Gibbs, supra note 4, at 4. See also Mary Jane Fisher, Insurer Solvency Threatened
by Pollution Cleanup Liability, NAT'L. UNDERWRITER Co.; Property and Casualty/Risk
& Benefits Edition, Oct. 22, 1990, 2; James M. Burcke, Insurer Solvency Will Be Key in
1991: Survey, Bus. INS., Dec. 31, 1990 at 12. (citing survey of risk managers and noting
estimated costs of cleanup and insurance industry's surplus).
10. Feder, supra note 6; see also Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Triangle Indus., Inc., 390
S.E.2d 562, 567 (W. Va. 1990); Federal Ins. Co. v. Susquehanna Broadcasting Co., 727
F. Supp. 174 (M.D.Pa. 1989) (court determined that under Pennsylvania law, damages
must be interpreted in a technical sense, entitling plaintiffs to indemnification by the
insurance company for cleanup costs of two Pennsylvania sites not in excess of property
value), amended in part, 738 F. Supp. 896 (1990), aff d, 928 F.2d 1131 (1991), cert.
denied, 112 S.Ct. 86 (1991).
11. Edward Brodsky, Liability for Environmental Damages, N.Y. LJ., Jan. 15, 1992,
at 3.
12. 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Missouri V.
Continental Ins. Co., 488 U.S. 821 (1988).
13. 944 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
14. Continental Ins. Co., 842 F.2d at 987 (acting without guidance from the Missouri
Supreme Court).
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Although neither party was incorporated in the District of
Columbia, the insureds in Independent Petrochemical were able to bring
their case to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia because the District of Columbia Superintendent of Insurance
accepted service of process for the defendant insurers. 5 The D.C. Circuit
court explicitly rejected the holding of the Eight Circuit panel, concluding
that the insurers were legally obligated to reimburse the insureds for
cleanup costs. 16
This article addresses the state of the law regarding environmental
cleanup costs in the federal and state courts in the region of the Fourth
Circuit. 7 Five primary issues form the basis of most suits between
insureds and insurers for defense and indemnification. Each issue requires
courts to interpret CGL clauses used throughout the industry.
The first issue is whether a PRP notification letter serves as notice
of a suit, and whether an administrative proceeding constitutes a suit.
Second, the court must define "damages" ' and state whether that term
includes equitable damages such as the cost of remedial and prophylactic
measures, or only legal monetary damage to property. Third, a court must
determine the applicability of the Owned Property Exclusion to cleanup of
the insured's own property. Whether contamination is likely to spread to
a neighbor's property affects the reading of the Owned Property Exclusion
clause. The Pollution Exclusion, barring coverage for pollution that was
not "sudden and accidental," forms the fourth issue of contention. 9
Finally, the court must decide whether a CGL provision excluding
coverage for any "occurrence" that was the "expected or intended"
outcome of insured's action bars coverage.2
One or more of these issues presents itself in every case regarding
15. Indep. Petrochemical, 944 F.2d at 943.
,16. Id. at 946. ("Deference is one thing; blind adherence quite another .... we will
not follow another circuit's decision if that court 'ignored clear signals emanating from
the state courts' or 'clearly misread state law.'") (citation omitted).
17. The states composing the Fourth Circuit are: Maryland, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia.
18. See Milt Policzer, Courts are Divided Over Definition of "Damages," NAT'L L.J.,
Nov. 25, 1991 at 28.
19. For an excellent discussion of the pollution exclusion, see E. Joshua Rosenkranz,
Note, The Pollution Exclusion Clause Through the Looking Glass. 74 GEO. LJ. 1237
(1986).
20. See Feder, supra note 6 (discussing courts' various interpretations of the meaning
of occurrence).
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an insured's coverage for environmental cleanup. This article serves as a
summary of the issues involved in such cases and the ways in which the
state and federal courts in the region of the Fourth Circuit have resolved
these issues.
MAJOR ISSUES IN INSURANCE LITIGATION
1. The "Suit" Requirement
a. Plain Meaning Definition of a "Suit"
Property insurance policies typically provide for defense and
indemnification in any lawsuit involving property damage.21 Insurers
argue for a bright-line test and a narrow interpretation of policy language
limiting coverage to occasions on which an actual lawsuit is filed against
the insured.2 Under this strict interpretation, a PRP letter from the EPA
or a state agency notifying an insured of potential liability for
environmental damage and cleanup costs does not constitute a "suit" within
the meaning of the policy.'
In support of this position, insurers point to language in the policy
distinguishing between the mandatory duty to defend "suits" from the
option to investigate an insured's claims.' Additionally, insurers warn
courts that by adopting the broader interpretation of the policy advocated
by policyholders, courts obscure the bright line between complaints and all
other claims, thereby causing one of two undesirable results. Either the
courts will have to make the determination of when a claim becomes a suit
on a regular basis, or insurers will be forced to defend all claims against
insureds, a result not intended by the parties to the contract.25 Finally,
insurers contend that liberal construction of policy terms merely serves to
foster litigation.' Courts which adhere to the general rule of contract
interpretation, that unambiguous words should be given their "plain
meaning," agree with insurers and limit the meaning of suit to the filing
21. Id.
22. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Pintlar Corp., 948 F.2d 1507, 1517 (9th Cir.
1991); Ryan v. Royal Ins. Co. of America, 916 F.2d 731, 735 (1st Cir. 1990).
23. Ryan, 916 F.2d at 742.





b. A Reasonable Person's Definition of a "Suit"
At the opposite end of the spectrum, policyholders claim that an
insurer's duty to defend arises whenever a state or federal agency
determines that an environmental condition needs improvement and
notifies the policyholder of that determination.2s Insureds argue that
because the policies do not define the term "suit," courts should apply a
reasonable person test and thereby refrain from limiting the meaning of the
term.29 Under the reasonable person theory, an ordinary insured would'
consider a PRP notice as itself prompting the need to defend, thus
initiating a "suit."30
Insureds distinguish a PRP letter from a typical demand letter by
noting that a PRP notice contains "immediate and severe implications. "31
In a tort action, a plaintiff cannot affect a PRP's rights adversely between
the occurrence of the tort and the filing of the complaint.32 By contrast,
a PRP's "substantive rights and ultimate liability are affected from the start
of the administrative process."3 3 A PRP often finds it more cost-effective
to perform environmental studies and cleanup measures itself, rather than
wait for the EPA to perform the work and initiate a cost recovery
27. See, e.g., Braswell v. Faircloth, 387 S.E.2d 707,709 (S.C. CL App. 1989) ("Policy
language must be given its plain, ordinary, and popular meaning."); Continental Ins. Co.
v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical Co., 811 F.2d 1180, 1188 n.21. (8th Cir.
1987) ("Citation to meaning given ordinary language in a respected dictionary is
particularly relevant in a case involving the construction of insurance policy terms because
of the well-established principle that insurance policy language must be given the meaning
that it would convey to an ordinary insured") (citation omitted); Wachovia Bank & Trust
Co. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 172 S.E.2d 518, 522 (N.C. 1970).
28. Ryan, 916 F.2d at 742.
29. Aetna, 948 F.2d at 1516.
30. Id. (citing Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Ex-Cell Corp., 662 F. Supp. 71, 75
(E.D.Mich. 1987) ("[A] 'suit' includes any effort to impose on policyholders a liability
ultimately enforceable by a court .... ); Avondale Indus. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 887
F.2d 1200, 1207 (2nd Cir. 1989) (stating that "suit" in the terms of a policy included
administrative proceeding)).
31. Aetna, 948 F.2d at 1516.
32. Id.
33. Id. (citing Avondale, 697 F. Supp. 1314, 1321 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("Adverse
consequences can befall an insured during the administrative pollution cleanup process."),
affd, 887 F.2d 1200 (2d Cir. 1989)).
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action. 3' Failure to cooperate with the EPA can result in increased
liability for an insured, including paying the EPA's litigation costs.3"
Based on the incentives to comply with the EPA upon receipt of a PRP
notice, some courts have held that an "ordinary person" would understand
a PRP notice to be the commencement of a "suit" requiring a legal
defense.36 The insureds' contend that the purpose of liability insurance
is to protect against risk of loss of assets through liability; the manner of
loss (litigation, administrative proceeding or other) remains irrelevant to
an insured because they all have the same economic impact.37
c. The Fourth Circuit and Other Courts' Definition of "Suit"
Courts typically have sought a middle ground between these
extreme approaches and have consequently developed other tests to
determine when the duty to defend arises. Most courts place a significaqt
initial burden on the policyholder of a CGL by requiring proof that the
claim was made in terms of coerciveness or adversariness. 38  A
substantially similar test finds the duty to defend when the government
makes a serious effort to force the insured to take action or makes clear
that serious consequences will follow the failure to act.39 Both of these
tests focus on the probability of liability. A third theory studies whether
the defense is required because of an implied serious offense or whether
the insured has been "legally threatened."
State courts within the geographic region of the Fourth Circuit have
examined each of these theories. Maryland courts have held that an
insurer's duty to defend arises when there is a "possibility" of liability.41
North Carolina courts, by contrast, have found that a compliance order
from a state agency ordering a lessor and a lessee to remove hazardous
waste from the leased premises meets the suit requirement of a CGL
policy when the order represents an attempt by a state "to gain an end by
34. Aetna, 948 F.2d at 1517.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Ryan, 916 F.2d at 740.
38. Id. at 738 (citing Avondale Indus. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 887 F.2d 1200, 1206).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 739 (citing Avondale, 887 F.2d at 1206 and Continental Cas. Co. v. Cole,
809 F.2d 891, 898-9 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
41. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, 822 F.2d 1348, 1354 (4th Cir. 1987) (citing
Continental Casualty Co. v. Bd. of Educ. of Charles County, 489 A.2d 536 (Md. 1985)).
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legal process. '42 In Spangler, the North Carolina Supreme Court noted
that because "suit" was not defined in the policy it "should be given that
meaning it has acquired in ordinary speech. ' The court reasoned that
a person in the position of the insured may not have understood the term
"suit" as limiting "[the insurer's] duty to defend" to actual litigation."
2. Defining Damages
The definition of "damages" has been at least as highly litigated as
the definition of "suit," and for similar reasons.45 Debate focuses on the
plain and ordinary meaning of the word "damages." Not only must words
in an insurance contract be given their plain meanings, but when terms can
have more than one meaning, they are construed in favor of the insured
because the insurers write the policies. 46 Courts have interpreted "plain
meaning" in two distinctly different ways.
CERCLA empowers the government to sue PRPs for "all costs of
removal or remedial action incurred by the United States"'47 as well as for
42. C.D. Spangler Constr. Co. v. Indus. Crankshaft and Eng'g. Co., Inc., 388 S.E.2d
557, 570 (N.C. 1990) (following the plain meaning rule of interpreting insurance
contracts).
43. Id. at 570.
44. Id.
45. Policzer, supra note 18, at 28 (discussing how courts split over the definition of
'"damages").
46. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 172 S.E.2d 518, 522
(N.C. 1970).
47. 42 U.S.C. §9607(a)(1)-(4) (1988). CERCLA §107 reads in part:
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous
substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities or sites
selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened
release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous
substance, shall be liable for --
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the
United States Government or a State ... not inconsistent with the
national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other
person consistent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural
resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury,
destruction, or loss resulting from such a release.
42 U.S.C. §9607(a)(4).
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"damages or injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources."'
Because CERCLA is a federal statute, its interpretation is a question of
federal law.49 Courts have agreed that CERCLA response cost suits are
equitable, rather than legal in nature."
a. The Fourth Circuit's Definition of Damages
In Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco s1 a Fourth Circuit panel
interpreted section 9607(a)(1)-(4)(A) as providing the government with the
equitable remedy of restitution.52  In Armco, the insurer sought a
declaratory judgment that it had no duty to defend its insured in a
CERCLA suit for reimbursement and injunctive relief brought by the EPA
because of an alleged endangerment to the environment at a hazardous
waste site in Missouri. 3 The insured argued that "damages" included
almost any claim for monetary relief, because the applicable state law
provided that "the terms of an insurance policy are to be construed
according to the meaning a reasonably prudent layman would infer."' 4
The court, however, stated that "damages" should be construed in accord
with its "accepted technical meaning in law."55  Interpreting the statute
under the law of Maryland,' the court held that a CGL with a standard
coverage clause did not impose upon the insurer either a duty to defend or
48. Id. at §9607(C).
49. Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Milliken and Col, 857 F.2d 979, 980 (4th Cir. 1988).
50. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, 822 F.2d 1348, 1351 (4th Cir. 1987) (citing
district court opinion).
51. 822 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir. 1987).
52. Id. at 1352 (following Mraz v. Universal Insurance Co., 804 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir.
1986) as to interpretation of § 9607). The court held that a claim pursuant to CERCLA
was a claim for "equitable, remedial relief." Id.
53. Id. at 1350. In the Missouri suit, United States v. Conservation Chemical Co., 653
F. Supp. 152 (W.D. Mo. 1986), the United States sued both the owners of a waste storage
facility and the "original waste generator" defendants; one of those defendants was Armco.
The complaint alleged that faulty storage of hazardous waste at the site had resulted in
contamination of soil, groundwater and nearby rivers. Id.
54. Id. at 1352 (citing Pacific Indem. Co. v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 488 A.2d 486,
488 (Md. 1985)). But see Aetna Cas. and Surety Co. v. Hanna, 224 F.2d 499, 503 (5th
Cir. 1955) ("'damages' as distinguished from claims for injunctive or restitutionary relief,
includes only payments to third persons when those person have a legal claim for
damages .... ").
55. Maryland Casualty Co., 822 F.2d at 1352 (quoting Aetna Casualty and Surety Co.
v. Hanna, 224 F.2d 499, 503, (5th Cir. 1955)).
56. Id. at 1354.
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a duty to indemnify the insured against the government's claim for
restitution, because the clause covered legal but not equitable
"damages." The appellate court affimned the district court's conclusion
that "[b]lack letter insurance law holds that claims for equitable relief are
not claims for 'damages' under liability insurance contracts"5' and then
agreed that claims under CERCLA section 107(a) were equitable in
nature.59
The Fourth Circuit applied South Carolina law in Cincinnati
Insurance Co. v. Milliken and Co.' but found "no material distinctions
between South Carolina and Maryland laws in the construction and
interpretation of insurance policies."6  South Carolina, like Maryland,
followed the plain meaning rule of interpretation of insurance contracts
when terms do not appear ambiguous.62  The court in Cincinnati
Insurance held that the term "damages" was not ambiguous in the
insurance context, and clearly referred to legal, not equitable claims.63
Other courts, however, have held that a claim for apparent equitable relief
for reimbursement of environmental cleanup expenses constitutes a claim
for "damages" within the terms of a standard CGL.'
57. Id. at 1351-54. Accord Continental Ins. Co. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and
Chemical Co. (NEPACCO), 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1988) (applying Missouri law). But
see Independent Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Cas. and Surety Co., 944 F.2d 940 (D.C.
Cir. 1991) (directly contradicting 8th Cir. on same question of Missouri law and holding
that equitable and legal damages were covered by CGL).
58. Maryland Casualty Co., 822 F.2d at 1352 (citing district court's opinion).
59. Id. at 1351 ("Every court that has considered the question has held that CERCLA
response cost suits fall on the equity side of the line") (citation omitted).
60. 857 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1988).
61. Id. at 980-81.
62. Id. at 981. (citing Sloan Constr. Co. v. Central Nat'l. Ins. Co., 236 S.E.2d 818,
819 (S.C. 1977)); Braswell v. Faircloth, 387 S.E.2d 707, 709 (S.C. 1989) (Court of
Appeals for South Carolina said, "Policy language must be given its plain, ordinary and
popular meaning."); See also Nat'l Grange MuL Ins. Co. v. Pinkney, 399 A.2d 877, 882
(Md. 1979).
63. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 857 F.2d at 980 (distinguishing "All sums which the insured
shall become legally obligated to pay" from sums insured becomes equitably obligated to
pay to the government and citing NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 985-87; Armco, 822 F.2d at
1352).
64. A Georgia district court, after certifying a question to the Georgia Supreme Court,
held that a landowner's primary and excess liability insurance carriers were liable for
"damages" incuned in undertaking such remedial pollution measures as the EPA ordered
for cleanup of a Virginia site. Claussen v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 754 F. Supp.
1576 (Ga. 1990).
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As a whole, these cases illustrate the Fourth Circuit's reluctance to
hold insurance companies liable for insureds' costs under CERCLA, but
such reluctance is far from unanimous among the state and federal courts
nationally.
b. Other Courts' Definition of Damages
In contrast to Fourth Circuit precedent, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second, Third, Ninth and District of Columbia Circuits, as
well as several state courts, have held that response costs do represent
"damages" within the meaning of a CGL.5 In United States Aviex Co.
v. Travelers Insurance Co.,66 a Michigan state court held that "damages"
encompassed monies recovered to reimburse the government for costs of
investigating and correcting chemical contamination of percolating
waters.6' In rejecting the insurer's argument for a narrow interpretation
of damages limited to compensation for injury or loss, the court reasoned
that the "merely fortuitous" event that the state had decided to remove the
65. Aetna Cas. and Surety Co., Inc. v. Pintlar Corp., 948 F.2d 1507, 1512 (9th Cir.
1991) (citing Ind. Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 944 F.2d 940 (D.C.
Cir. 1991) (applying Missouri law)); New Castle County v. Hartford Accid. and Indem.
Co., 933 F.2d 1162, 1188 (3d Cir. 1991) (construing Delaware law); Avondale Indus. v.
Travelers Indem. Co., 887 F.2d 1200, 1207 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 2588
(1990) (following New York law); Port of Portland v. Water Quality Ins. Syndicate, 796
F.2d 1188, 1194 (9th Cir. 1986) (interpreting Oregon law); Chesapeake Utilities Corp. v.
Amer. Home Assur. Co., 704 F. Supp. 551, 561 (D.Del. 1989) (under Maryland law, the
term "damages" does not, as a matter, exclude cleanup costs); Intel Corp., v. Hartford
Accid. & Indem. Co., 692 F. Supp. 1171, 1193 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (following California
law), appeal pending, No. 89-15164 (9th Cir. 1989); United States Fidelity Guar. Co. v.
Thomas Solvent Co., 683 F. Supp. 1139, 1168 (W.D. Mich 1988) (applying Illinois law
and holding that "[w]hile ... claims [for cleanup costs] might be characterized as seeking
'equitable relief' the cleanup costs are essentially compensatory damages for injury to
common property and for that reason the insurer has a duty to defend."); Firemen's Fund
Ins. Co. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 662 F. Supp. 71, 75 (E.D. Mich. 1987) ("'[Dlamages'
include money spent to clean up environmental contaminations."); AIU Ins. Co. v.
Superior Court (FMS Corp.), 799 P.2d 1253, 1275-78 (Cal. 1990) (holding that under
California law, insurers are obligated to provide coverage for cleanup and other "response
costs" incurred under CERCLA); The Boeing Co. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 784
P.2d 507, 516 (1990) (en banc) (holding that response costs are "damages" under the CGL
clause at issue). The following state supreme courts have also found that "damages"
includes cleanup costs: Colorado, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North Carolina,
Washington.
66. 125 Mich. App. 579, 336 N.W.2d 838 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
67. Id. at 843.
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contamination itself and then sue for reimbursement, rather than initially
suing for damages, should not permit the insurer to escape liability under
its policy."
Courts have offered other arguments for inclusion of equitable
remedies. The holding in Continental Insurance Co. v. NEPACCO"
supports the proposition that environmental damage constitutes property
damage within the meaning of a CGL.70 In dicta, the Eighth Circuit held
that "damages" included equitable relief because the measure of damages
was the same for both legal and for equitable damages.? Insureds have
proposed a second theory to demonstrate that CGLs cover response costs,
arguing that such costs are "mitigation" costs, because they save money for
the insurer by preventing legal damages which the CGL would cover.
72
This theory only applies, however, when an insurance policy specifically
obligates the insured to reimburse expenses undertaken to mitigate the
amount of damages.
The Aviex court measured damages as the cost of restoring the
contaminated water to its original condition.7 4 The court in Armco later
criticized this approach. 7  According to the court, the problem with
determining the extent of liability without regard to whether a party sues
for costs or for damages is that restoring a damaged marsh may cost far
more than paying damages for its loss. 76  Additionally, insurance
companies traditionally have been very reluctant to cover costs of
prophylactic measures (e.g., safety precautions) because such expenses are
subject to the discretion of the insured, and are not related to any harm to
68. Id.
69. 811 F.2d 1180 (8th Cir. 1987), reh'g granted, 815 F.2d 51 (8th Cir. 1987) (en
banc).
70. Id. at 1187.
71. Id. at 1187-88.
72. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Annco, 822 F.2d 1348, 1354 - 55 (citing Consolidated
Rail Corporation v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, No. 84-2069, slip opinion (E.D.Pa.
June 3, 1986); Bankers Trust Co. v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 518 F. Supp.
371 (S.D.N.Y.), vacated due to settlement, 621 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text (discussing Armco).
76. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, 822 F.2d 1348, 1352 (referring to Peevyhouse
v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 906
(1963) (in which the costs of restoring stripmined land was more than four times its
potential value in restored condition)).
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particular third parties.' The insurance industry bases all of its
calculations on certainty as to the extent of its liability, and the industry
intends for insurance policies to embody this certainty 8
3. The Owned Property Exclusion
Liability insurance usually serves to cover harm to third parties,
rather than to the insured.79 The owned property exclusion refers to a
provision in the standard CGL which refuses to cover damage to "property
owned or occupied by or rented to the insured.' Generally, the insured
in a response costs case owns or operates the property which is to be
cleaned, and thus some courts hold that such ownership prevents
coverage." In order for insurance to cover property damage caused by
pollution, the damage somehow must reach the property of third parties.8 2
Courts often do find coverage, however, and hold that remedial
measures are performed to prevent harm to third parties," particularly
when groundwater is involved because its transitory nature precludes
control by the insured." Two California cases demonstrate the limits of
this exception. The United States District Court for the Northern District
77. Id. at 1353.
78. Id. Insurers view the government's investigative and remedial actions regarding
potential environmental hazards as prophylactic measures. The fundamental purpose of
such actions, regardless of whether some damage has already occurred, is to prevent or
mitigate the (re)occurrence of hazardous contamination, a prophylactic purpose. Id. at
1353-54. Compare Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Pintlar Corp., 948 F.2d 1507, 1515
(9th Cir. 1991) ("Response costs in this case are remedial. They are incurred as a result
of responding to contamination; they are not simply a government-imposed cost of doing
business for firms which release hazardous substances. They are not imposed to prevent
property damage, rather, they are imposed "because of... property damage.") See also
Aerojet-General Corp. v. Superior Court of San Mateo County (Chesire and Companies),
211 Cal. App. 3d 216, 234 (1st Dist. 1989) ("[Plrophylactic costs are not incurred
'because of injury to, or loss, destruction or loss of use of property'...
79. Eubank, supra note 3, at 204.
80. Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 692 F.Supp. 1171, 1182
(N.D. Cal. 1988).
81. See Eubank, supra note 3, at 208.
82. Western World Ins. Co. v. Dana, 765 F. Supp. 1011, 1015 (E.D. Cal. 1991).




of California, in Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co.,8
held that a CGL covered groundwater cleanup costs reasoning that
groundwater is the property of all Californians and its contamination
constitutes injury to third parties." The California Eastern District Court,
however, refused to extend that rationale to cover contamination of soil on
the insured's own property.8 Courts within the Fourth Circuit's
geographic region have not yet addressed these issues directly.
4. The Pollution Exclusionms
In response to courts' rulings that various policyholders were
covered by their CGLs for millions of dollars in cleanup costs, the
insurance industry has sought to limit its liability by creating the pollution
exclusion.89 The provision limits coverage to "occurrences" that were
"sudden and accidental."' 9 Not surprisingly, courts, insurance companies,
and insureds have interpreted these terms in a wide range of ways.
Prior to 1966, CGLs strictly limited coverage to personal injury and
property damage caused by accident." Courts defined "accident"
expansively but insurers intended the term to mean "an identifiable event
which is sudden, detrimental and fixed in time and place, rather than...
gradual injury or damage."'  The massive environmental damage and
personal injury awards that insurers had feared if gradual losses were
covered materialized when companies cashed in on coverage for damage
85. 692 F. Supp. 1171 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
86. Id. at 1183.
87. Western World Ins. Co. v. Dana, 765 F. Supp. 1011, 1014 (E.D. Cal. 1991).
88. The standard pollution exclusion reads as follows:
It is agreed that the insurance does not apply to bodily injury
or property damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or
escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals,
liquids or gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or
pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any watercourse or body
of water; but this exclusion does not apply if such discharge, dispersal,
release or escape is sudden and accidental.
Robert S. Soderstrom, The Role of lnsurance in Environmental Litigation, 11 FoRUM 762,
766 (1976) (quoting Insurance Rating Board form).
89. See Rosenkranz, supra note 19, at 1237. (discussing the enormity of potential
liability in environmental cleanup and the response of the insurance industry).
90. Id at 1242.
91. Id. at 1241.
92. Id at 1237 (distinguishes insurer's intended meaning of the word "accident" from
courts' actual interpretation of the word).
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created by years and even decades of negligence."
Generally courts have shown sympathy to insureds under the
pollution exclusion and foiled the insurance industry's attempt to limit
liability." A variety of definitions for "accident" have developed through
litigation. 5 Courts are divided on whether or not an "accident" as
defined in an accident-based policy has to be sudden."
The leading case interpreting the pollution exclusion, Lansco v.
Department of Environmental Protection," dealt with the central question
surrounding the clause: from whose perspective should a court view the
suddenness and degree of expectation of the event.98 In Lansco, the
insured filed a declaratory judgment action seeking coverage under a CGL
for costs of cleaning up an oil spill.99 Lansco had leased riverfront
property in New Jersey on which it maintained tanks storing asphaltic
oil.' 0 On a December night in 1974, one or more unknown persons
opened the valves on two storage tanks, releasing 14,000 gallons of oil
onto the property and eventually into the Hackensack River."°1 The
court found this occurrence to be "both sudden and accidental within the
ordinarily accepted meaning of those words"' 2 and found coverage
93. See, e.g., Waste Management v. Peerless Ins. Co., 323 S.E.2d 726 (1984), rev'd,
340 S.E.2d 374 (N.C. 1986). One of the most difficult problems in Superfund litigation
is assembling the defendants and theh tracing the forms of pollution each created at a
given site over a specific period of use. A particular site, for example, may have been
a tannery, an industrial factory and a chemical laboratory at various points over a fifty
year period; see also Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir. 1986).
94. For an extreme example of a court's sympathy, see Ashland Oil Co., Inc. v.
Miller Oil Purchasing Co., 678 F.2d 1293, 1320 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (adopting
and reprinting trial court opinion). In that case a disposer of hazardous waste injected the
waste into the pipelines of customers without their knowledge. This party, however,
received insurance coverage for resulting damage because although the insured expected
and intended the results, Louisiana law considered "accident" from the perspective of the
injured party unless a term in the policy directed otherwise).
95. See Rosenkranz, supra note 19 at 1243 nn.34-36 (noting that some courts
precluded coverage for losses they found "foreseeable" while others required only that the
event be "unexpected and unintended" in order to receive coverage).
96. Id. at 1245.
97. 350 A.2d 520 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975), affd, 368 A.2d 363 (NJ. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1976), cert. denied, 372 A.2d 322 (1977).
98. See Rosenkranz, supra note 19 at 1245.
99. Lansco, 350 A.2d at 521.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 523.
CERCLA CLEANUP COSTS
under the policy. 0 3 The court in Lansco held that the event should be
examined from the standpoint of the insured and held that "sudden" meant
"unforeseen" while "accident" meant "unintended."'"
a. The Fourth Circuit's Treatment of the Pollution Exclusion
The first case to address this issue in the Southeast, Waste
Management of Carolinas v. Peerless Insurance Co.,'0 5 stated that any
ambiguities within the pollution exclusion should be resolved in favor of
the insured,'06 and found that the insurer had a duty to defend.'
°7
Although the North Carolina Supreme Court subsequently reversed this'
decision, the intermediate court's holding represents the majority view.108
In Waste Management, a trash collector, Trash Removal Services,
Inc. ("TRS"), intentionally dumped toxic waste materials into a landfill
over a period of six years,"° thereby causing the unintended and
unexpected leaking of contaminants from the waste materials into the
groundwater beneath the landfill."0 The federal government brought a
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA")'" action against the
owners and operators of the landfill.' 2  The defendants brought third-
party complaints against TRS seeking indemnity for or contribution to
whatever liability they incurred in the RCRA suit and alleging negligence
by TRS in transport and disposal of the materials." 3 TRS then sought
a declaration of coverage in a suit against its own liability insurers."4
The CGLs, identical in pertinent part, did not define "accident," so
103. Id. at 523, 526.
104. Id. at 524.
105. 323 S.E.2d 726 (N.C. App. 1984), rev'd, 340 S.E.2d 374 (1986).
106. Id. at 732.
107. Id. at 733.
108. The North Carolina Supreme Court and the Appeals Court used the "comparison
test" to determine whether a duty to defend existed. Waste Management, 340 S.E.2d at
378. Under that test "the pleadings are read side-by-side with the policy to determine
whether the events as alleged are covered or excluded. Any doubt as to coverage is to
be resolved in favor of the insured." Id. (citing Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v.
Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 172 S.E.2d 518 (N.C. 1970); Stout v. Grain Dealers Mutual Ins.
Co., 307 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1962)).
109. Id. at 726.
110. Id. at 734.
111. 42 U.S.C. § 6901-6992k (1988) This suit was filed under §7003.
112. Waste Management, 323 S.E.2d at 728.
113. Id. at 729.
114. Id.
19921
76 WM. & MARY JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol.16:61
the intermediate court applied its standard definition: "that which happens
by chance or fortuitously, without intention or design, and which is
unexpected, unusual and unforeseen. n"" 5 In determining that the insureds
owed a duty to defend, the court held that "what determines whether an
accident has occurred are intent and expectation of bodily injury and
property damage, and ... whether the event is unexpected or unintended
should be determined 'from the standpoint of the insured.'
1 6
In reversing the intermediate court's decision, the Supreme Court
of North Carolina expressly found that the provisions at issue were not
ambiguous and thus the court gave the words their plain and ordinary
meanings.117 The court found that the leaking of contaminants into the
groundwater was "arguably unexpected and unintended," or accidental, but
that the events fell within the pollution exclusion because the complaint
did not allege that the leaking was "sudden.""1 8 The court noted that the
exclusion focused on the nature of the damage more than on the accidental
nature of the occurrence. 9 The court noted that "the exclusion limits
the insurer's liability for accidental events by excluding damage caused by
the gradual release, escape, discharge, or dispersal of irritants,
contaminants, or pollutants."' 20  The court warned that if courts
considered the release of contaminants alone to be the key to the clause,
the sudden and accidental exception could be "bootstrapped onto almost
any allegations that [did] not specify a gradual release or emission. "121
The policy behind the clause is to eliminate the incentive of the
115. Id. at 731 (citing City of Wilmington v. Pigott, 307 S.E.2d 857, 859 (N.C. App.
1983) (citations omitted)).
116. Id. (quoting Edwards v. Akion, 279 S.E.2d 894, 896 (1981), affd per curiam,
284 S.E.2d 518 (N.C. App. 1981)). The court noted that the inquiry into the intent or
expectation should be a subjective rather than an objective one ("whether the insured
'should have' expected the resulting damage"). Id. But compare Harleysville Mut. Cas.
Co. v. Harris & Brooks, Inc., 235 A.2d 556, 559 (Md. 1967) (using an objective test and
holding no accident occurred where contractor burned pile of trees, underbrush and tires
for thirty-six hours and should have foreseen that smoke and soot would damage
property).
117. Waste Management, 340 S.E.2d at 380. See supra notes 22 and 44 and
accompanying text for discussion of plain meaning rule of contract interpretation.
118. Id. at 380. Moreover, the damaging act itself, not the discovery of the damages
must be sudden. Id. at 380 n.7.
119. Id. at 380 (stating that the "focus of the exclusion is not upon the release but




insured to be uninformed and negligent regarding the transport, disposal
and containment of hazardous materials. " This court did not intend to
punish insureds who were regularly vigilant in their care of hazardous
materials and had a single mishap. The court sought to avoid rewarding
those who dealt regularly with hazardous materials but did so in a careless
manner, coverage should not apply to these insureds for their mishaps.
Policy issues strongly influence courts in their interpretation of the key
words and phrases of CGLs.
5. The Definition of "Occurrence"
In order for a policyholder to be entitled to indemnification from
its insurer, the complaint against the insured which prompts the
policyholder to seek coverage must allege an occurrence within the
meaning of the CGL.1  The word "occurrence," as used in the pollution
exclusion clause and other provisions of the standard CGL, has turned out
to be another ambiguous contract term requiring court interpretation.
Courts generally analyze this term in conjunction with the terms "sudden"
and "accidental.'' The insurance industry claims that the definition of
"occurrence" was not meant to include pollution-related losses that were
"natural and obvious consequence[s] [of] the regular operation of a
business."'5
The controversy surrounds the determination of when the
occurrence happens and whether the event falls within the policy period
of the CGL. The general rule states that "[t]he time of the occurrence of
an accident within the meaning of an indemnity policy is not the time the
wrongful act was committed but the time when the complaining party was
actually damaged."'" Many of the Superfund cases "involve a wrongful
act that produces no harm for a period of time and then suddenly manifests
122. Waste Management of Carolinas v. Peerless Ins. Co., 340 S.E.2d 374, 380 (N.C.
1986).
123. Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325, 1327-28 (4th Cir. 1986).
124. Waste Management, 340 S.E.2d at 380. See Steyer v. Westvaco Corp., 450 F.
Supp. 384, 388-89 (D. Md. 1978) (holding that an unexpected "occurrence" meant
unexpected damages rather than an unexpected event, in this case plant emission, and
finding no duty to defend) (emphasis added).
125. See Rosenkranz, supra note 19, at 1248 (citations omitted).
126. Mraz, 804 F.2d at 1328 (citing U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. American Ins.
Co., 345 N.E.2d 267, 270 (1976)).
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itself in a burst of damage."'"z In other cases the damage occurs but
remains undetected for an extended period of time."" In such cases,
determining exactly when the damage began can be difficult, if not
impossible.' 9 When confronted with this difficult determination, some
courts have decided that the occurrence took place when the injuries first
became apparent or were discovered.'"
a. The Fourth Circuit's Definition of "Occurrence"
The Fourth Circuit adopted the discovery rule for hazardous waste
burial cases in Mraz.131 The Mrazes, seeking to recover their cleanup
and removal costs incurred as a result of a leaking underground storage
tank, sued their insurance company under the theories of a duty to defend
and to indemnify.1' 2  The Mrazes' policy defined "occurrence" as "an
accident, including injurious exposure to conditions, which results, during
the policy period, in bodily injury or property damage, neither expected
nor intended from the standpoint of the insured" and also required that the
event occur during the policy period.33  The court followed the
"discovery" rule which states that "[t]he time of the occurrence of an
accident within the meaning of an indemnity policy is not the time the
wrongful act was committed but the time when the complaining party was
actually damaged."'3 Under the "discovery" rule, the complaint failed
to allege an occurrence because the date of discovery did not fall within
the policy period.
35
127. Travelers Ins. Co. v. C. J. Gayfer's & Co., 366 So.2d 1199, 1202 (Fla. App.
1979) (faulty roof drainage system finally leaks); Singsaas v. Diedrick, 238 N.W.2d 878,
880 (Minn. 1976) (collapse of negligently installed manlift); Peerless Ins. Co. v. Clough,
193 A.2d 444, 446 (N.H. 1963) (fire in negligently built chimney) (cited in Mraz, 804
F.2d at 1328).
128. See, e.g., Mraz, 804 F.2d at 1325.
129. Id. at 1328.
130. See Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 56, 62 (3d Cir.
1982); c.f. Bartholomew v. Appalachian Ins. Co., 655 F.2d 27, 28 (1st Cir. 1981) (when
the defect takes place or is discovered); Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. PPG Industries, Inc.,
554 F. Supp. 290, 294 (D. Ariz. 1983) (coverage is based upon the time the damage was
discovered).
131. 804 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir. 1986).
132. Id. at 1326.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1328 (citing United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. American. Ins. Co.,
345 N.E.2d 267, 270 (Ind. App. 1976)).
135. Id.
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The Court of Appeals of South Carolina also considered the
definition of occurrence under a policy considerably identical to the policy
in Mraz.36 In Braswell the plaintiff-lessor sued his former lessee and
the lessee's insurer seeking coverage of an award against lessee for
damages caused by a chemical spill on the leased property, an award on
which lessee had defaulted.'3 In this case, the trial court focused on the
deliberateness of the lessee's breach of the lease, as evidenced by
abandonment of the property and deliberate and knowing abandonment of
hazardous waste in various forms on the property.13 In the court's view,
these intentional acts did not constitute "an accident ... neither expected
nor intended from the standpoint of the insured."'13  The plaintiff sought
to persuade the court to focus on the chemical spill, rather than the breach
of the lease, as the occurrence. 40 The Court of Appeals found that such
an event constituted an occurrence within the meaning of the policy.'41
Additionally, the court determined that the spill caused property damage
within the meaning of the policy but that the mere storage of chemicals on
the land did not.1
42
In a situation similar to Braswell, the Fourth Circuit agreed that the
date of discovery rule properly applied to a case in which a discovery was
made that a gasoline tank had been leaking for some time and had
contaminated a third party's water supply.1 43 With its holding in Mraz
and subsequent cases, the Fourth Circuit has joined the majority of courts
who have adopted the date of discovery rule when defining "occurrence"
in the CGL policy.
136. Braswell v. Faircloth, 387 S.E.2d 707 (S.C. App. 1989).
137. Id. at 708-709.
138. Id. at 709.
139. Id. (quoting defendant-lessee's insurance policy).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 709-710.
142. Id. at 711.
143. Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Federated Mutual Ins. Co., No. 89-2822, slip. op.(D. S.C. Dec 16, 1990). Water was first found in the gasoline tank in 1972. Use of the
tank was then discontinued but the owner continued to purchase gasoline for the store on
that site through 1982. The contamination of a neighbor's water supply was discovered
in 1983. The companies which insured the owner from 1977 to January 1. 1983 were not
liable for any damages. The insurer whose CGL began to run on January 1, 1983 was
liable for all damages to the third party in a settlement negotiation.
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CONCLUSION
The federal and state courts in the geographic region of the Fourth
Circuit have not dealt directly with all of the issues discussed in this
Article, but based on the relevant rulings the state and federal courts in this
district have made, some conclusions can be drawn. Most courts will find
that a "suit" exists sufficient to invoke an insurer's duty to defend when
some reasonable possibility of liability exists, based on the terms of the
policy and the terms of the complaint. Courts have more difficulty, though
not an insurmountable reluctance, to find that PRP notices and other means
less direct than litigation fulfill the suit requirement. Courts within the
geographic region of the Fourth Circuit seem to have decided that
insurance companies should not bear the costs of equitable damages in the
absence of extraordinary circumstances. Increasing pressure from other
circuit courts, however, could cause a reversal on this point; the trend,
though barely discernable, is to make the insurance company pay for the
response costs under CERCLA. Insureds may have to use creative
arguments or forum shop, or perhaps remove the case to the D.C. Circuit
court if possible, in order to win on this point presently. The terms
"sudden," "accidental" and "occurrence" all work together in the pollution
exclusion and are interpreted in relation to each other. In the end a court's
predisposition to which party should bear the costs of environmental
cleanup informs its decision.
Today, the market for traditional liability insurance has changed
radically as most firms no longer carry CGLs and new companies have
begun to fill the need; such insurance, however, can be prohibitively
expensive. The old policies continue to haunt us as new pollution sites are
discovered regularly and old policies must be interpreted in a climate much
different from the one during which they were written.
